Showing posts with label Collections. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Collections. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 18, 2017

KCBA Seminar Materials

I am speaking at the KCBA Commercial Law Seminar this afternoon on citations to discover assets. I just received late notice that my materials were not copied for the attendees. HERE is a PDF of my handout. It is also embedded below. Thanks.

Saturday, September 26, 2015

Peter Rogan Will Plead Guilty to Perjury for Lying During a Citation

Peter Rogan was on the wrong side of one of the most famous "collections" cases of all time. I wrote a five-part blog post about Dexia v. Rogan back in 2011. The Dexia case involved more than $100 million and the resulting opinion from the 7th Circuit contained nearly that many tips for commercial litigators. My original post can be found HERE.

I was fortunate enough to attend a seminar given by the plaintiff's lawyers about this case. It was absolutely fascinating. These guys literally traveled the globe to recover Rogan's assets. He had established trusts that were located in multiple foreign countries around the world. His current perjury charges stemmed from his denials under oath about those trusts during a citation to discover assets.

Mr. Rogan was back in the news this week because he finally returned to Chicago after fighting extradition from Canada for the last several years. He is expected to plead guilty to perjury this week and could be sentenced immediately. All "collections" lawyers will smile when the cell door closes behind this guy.

Saturday, June 21, 2014

Does a creditor have to release a bank citation if the debtor files bankruptcy?

A third party citation served upon a bank operates as freeze on any money that the debtor has in his account. Plus, any funds that the debtor deposits after service, but prior to the termination of the citation, will also be subject to the citation freeze. If the debtor files bankruptcy, does the creditor have to dismiss the citation and release the account?

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois just analyzed this issue in the case In re Kuzniewski, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1443. In that case, after filing bankruptcy, the debtor's attorney made a demand upon the bank and the creditor's attorney to immediately release the account. The bank and the creditor's attorney refused and the debtor filed a motion for sanctions against each for violation of the automatic stay.

The court analyzed the unique nature of a citation lien under Illinois law. A citation lien gives a creditor secured status in a bankruptcy. While the automatic stay does prevent a creditor from taking certain actions in furtherance of a lawsuit, the Bankruptcy Code generally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a creditor in bankruptcy may be deprived of a property interest, including a lien. The court noted that there are several provisions of the Code that would authorize avoidance of the citation lien, but all of those provisions require notice and a hearing. Without notice and a hearing on an avoidance action, liens generally pass through bankruptcy. 

For these reasons, the court found that the creditor's actions did not violate the automatic stay. If the debtor wanted the account released, she had an obligation to file an adversary proceeding or a contested matter for avoidance of the lien, not simply make unsubstantiated demands that were not warranted by existing law. In other words, this was a decision to be made by a judge, not by debtor's counsel. 

Thursday, June 19, 2014

Citation to Discover Asset Materials

I had the pleasure to speak about citations to discover assets this morning at a Kane County Bar Association seminar. I mentioned to the audience that I would be placing several documents on this Blog.

First, HERE is an updated copy of my outline from the seminar.

Second, HERE is a copy of the modified citation form in Word format.

And, in case anybody is interested, HERE is a link to the Dexia case that I mentioned briefly at the end of my presentation as I was running out of time.

Please let me know if anybody has any questions about this morning's presentation, or anything else related to the collection of judgments.  

Friday, January 31, 2014

Someone didn't think this plan all the way through.

The majority of my practice involves the collection of debts in one form or other. I represent both creditors and debtors and almost every one of my cases involves somebody trying to get money from someone else.

Over the past ten years, I've seen many crazy and unbelievable things. But I've never seen anything this crazy. A woman in Russia recently underwent a sex change operation in an attempt to become a new person to get out of paying a debt.

Unfortunately, changing your gender does not make you an entirely different person and Nataly, now known as Andrian, is still liable for the original debt. HERE is a link to the article.

Friday, March 29, 2013

LLC Charging Orders

Charging orders are one of the more confusing areas of judgment enforcement law.  Ordinarily, a judgment creditor would serve a citation to discover assets and then look to the citation statute for enforcement procedures.  Under Section 1402, when non-exempt assets are discovered, the court can compel the judgment debtor to deliver those assets either to the sheriff or a private selling agent for sale.  The proceeds of the sale are then applied to the judgment.  This is commonly called a turnover order.  

However, you can't obtain a turnover order on a judgment debtor's interest in an LLC.  In order to do that, you'll need a charging order.  Section 30-20(a) of the Illinois Limited Liability Act provides that "on application by a judgment creditor of a member of a limited liability company or of a member's transferee, a court having jurisdiction may charge the distributional interest of the judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment."

I just read a case that further clarifies the procedures behind a charging order.  The case is Bank of America v. Freed, 2012 IL App (1st) 110749.  Here is the relevant paragraph:  

Under the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act (Act), a charging order only gives the judgment creditor the right to receive distributions to which the member would otherwise be entitled, and if the charging order is foreclosed, the purchaser would have only the rights of a transferee of distributional interests. Under section 30-1(a) of the Act, a member of an LLC “is not a co-owner of, and has no transferable interest in, property of a limited liability company.” 805 ILCS 180/30-1(a) (West 2008). Further, section 30-5 of the Act provides that a transfer of a distributional interest in an LLC does not give the transferee any rights as a member but only the right to receive distributions by the LLC, while section 30-10 provides that transferee may become a member only if all other members consent (805 ILCS 180/30-10(a) (West 2008)). A “transferee who does not become a member is not entitled to participate in the management or conduct of the limited liability company’s business, require access to information concerning the company’s transactions, or inspect or copy any of the company’s records.” 805 ILCS 180/30-10(d) (West 2008). Therefore, an Illinois LLC has no interest that is affected when a charging order is entered on a judgment debtor’s distributional interest because the party in whose favor the charging order is entered is not an owner of the LLC and has no authority over the LLC’s affairs and can only receive distributions. Hence, the LLC has no interest to be protected and need not be made a party.

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Writs of Attachment (Body Writs)

Illinois enacted a new body attachment statute last summer. Until then, it was my understanding that a rule to show cause had to be personally served upon the defendant before a body writ would issue.

This new statute, which I have copied and pasted below, seems to say that rules to show cause can now be served by personal or abode service.  Has anyone entered a body writ following abode service of a rule?  If so, in which county??


 (735 ILCS 5/12-107.5) 
    Sec. 12-107.5. Body attachment order.
    (a) No order of body attachment or other civil order for the incarceration or detention of a natural person respondent to answer for a charge of indirect civil contempt shall issue unless the respondent has first had an opportunity, after personal service or abode service of notice as provided in Supreme Court Rule 105, to appear in court to show cause why the respondent should not be held in contempt.
    (b) The notice shall be an order to show cause.
    (c) Any order issued pursuant to subsection (a) shall expire one year after the date of issue.
    (d) The first order issued pursuant to subsection (a) and directed to a respondent may be in the nature of a recognizance bond in the sum of no more than $1,000. 
    (e) Upon discharge of any bond secured by the posting of funds, the funds shall be returned to the respondent or other party posting the bond, less applicable fees, unless the court after inquiry determines that: (1) the judgment debtor willfully has refused to comply with a payment order entered in accordance with Section 2-1402 or an otherwise validly entered order; (2) the bond money belongs to the debtor as opposed to a third party; and (3) that any part of the funds constitute non-exempt funds of the judgment debtor, in which case the court may cause the non-exempt portion of the funds to be paid over to the judgment creditor. 
    (f) The requirements or limitations of this Section do not apply to the enforcement of any order or judgment resulting from an adjudication of a municipal ordinance violation that is subject to Supreme Court Rules 570 through 579, or from an administrative adjudication of such an ordinance violation. 
(Source: P.A. 97-848, eff. 7-25-12.)

Monday, May 21, 2012

Who really owns that car?

Did you know that the Illinois Secretary of State will perform a vehicle title search for $5.00?  Neither did I.  
  
Dawn Weekly pointed this out on the ISBA email list today.  Another attorney wanted to know who to subpoena to ascertain ownership of a car.  Dawn pointed out that the Secretary of State has a standard procedure for this and that no subpoena was necessary.

HERE is a link to the Information Request Form, which has also been added to the Forms Archive on this site.  

Please note that you must have a permissible purpose under the Driver Privacy Protection Act (18 U.S.C. 2721, et seq.).  Section E on page 2 of the form, however, gives broad leeway to attorneys who request this information in anticipation of litigation, in connection with litigation, or to enforce any judgment or order.

Thanks for the info Dawn!

Side note: If you haven't subscribed to the ISBA email lists yet, they are an invaluable resource.  Almost as good as this blog!!

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

The Northern District of Illinois will no longer mail Proof of Claim forms.

Effective Wednesday, September 21, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, will no longer include a Proof of Claim form with 341 notices or Chapter 7 notices establishing a claims deadline. This is a cost-savings measure following a study that showed less than 5% of the Proof of Claims included with the Court's notices were returned. 

This makes sense to me.  I haven't used the mailed forms the past couple of times that I have filed claims.  As soon as I receive notice of a Chapter 13 filing, I usually print the form myself from the Northern Law Blog's forms archive and have it filed long before the official form arrives in the mail 7-10 days later.  

Visit the Forms Archive on the right for the latest version of the POC form.

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

Condo/Homeowners Assessments in Bankruptcy

Section 523(a)(16) of the BAPCPA provides for an exception to discharge for assessments that come due after the bankruptcy petition is filed.  Associations can, therefore, pursue their members for assessments that accrue after the date of filing, but not those that accrue before the date of filing.

A new opinion issued this week by Judge Squires deals with an interesting situation where the debtors' unit flooded just two days before their bankruptcy filing.  Then, several months after the bankruptcy filing, the association levied a special assessment against all unit owners to cover the cost of the flooding.

The association sent several letters and notices to the debtors without obtaining relief from the stay or otherwise seeking the guidance of the bankruptcy court.  When those notices went unanswered, the association filed suit in state court.  The debtors then moved for sanctions against the association in bankruptcy court for a willful violation of the discharge order.

The issue for the bankruptcy court was whether this special assessment was a pre-petition or post-petition debt.  The court looked to the language of Section 523(a)(16), which excepts from discharge any assessments that "come due and payable" after the petition is filed.  The court did not give much weight to debtors' argument that the special assessment was related to a pre-petition obligation that arose on the date of the flooding.  Rather, the court looked to the date on which the special assessment came due and payable, which was after the petition date. 

HERE is a link to the opinion.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

Motions to Dismiss Chapter 13 Bankruptcies

When you get the bankruptcy notice in the mail, the case might not be over.  It may just be getting started.  If the bankruptcy is a Chapter 13, it is subject to dismissal for bad faith.  A finding of bad faith does not require fraudulent intent by the debtor. The bankruptcy judge is not required to have evidence of debtor ill-will directed at creditors, or that the debtor was affirmatively attempting to violate the law.  Inconsistencies and misrepresentations are usually enough to get the case dismissed, even if they are not intentional, if the sloppiness rises to the level of bad faith.  

You will want to analyze the petition for errors, omissions, or inconsistencies based on what you already know about the debtor and what appears on the face of the petition.  For instance, I recently had a case where the debtor only disclosed one checking account, but he had bounced a check to my client from a different account just several days before filing bankruptcy.  That was a major omission, but the smaller things can add up too.  Debtors frequently fail to disclose life insurance polices, but you'll see them deducting the premiums from their gross wages.  Or they will try to affirm debts that have monthly payments higher than their stated income.  

A motion to dismiss a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is filed under Section 1307(c) of the Code.  That section allows the trustee or any creditor to move for dismissal for 11 separate reasons, including failure to make any payment required by the plan, failure to make any domestic support obligation, etc.  Also, pursuant to the case law, bad faith is also a cause for dismissal under Section 1307(c). The bankruptcy court will apply the “totality of the circumstances” test when ruling on a motion to dismiss for bad faith. The test involves the following factors:

  • Whether the debtor misrepresented facts in his petition or plan, unfairly manipulated the Bankruptcy Code, or otherwise filed his Chapter 13 petition or plan in an inequitable manner;
  • The debtor’s history of filings and dismissals;
  • Whether the debtor only intended to defeat state court litigation; and
  • Whether egregious behavior is present.

If fraudulent intent can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, the debtor’s petition can be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Section 349(a) of the Code.  Even if the case is not dismissed with prejudice, it is still possible to obtain an order that the case can not be refiled for six months.  That means the automatic stay is not in effect and you can proceed to state court.  You will want to move quickly to accomplish your specific purpose, and the state court may help you do so once it learns the circumstances of the Ch. 13 dismissal.  

Call me with any questions.

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

FDCPA Update

Yesterday, I gave a very brief overview of the FDCPA.  I glossed over the prohibitions contained in the Act as I said they were common sense prohibitions that I didn't have time to analyze.  We'll it doesn't get any more common sense than this:  Don't kill people when trying to collect a debt.  First, dead people can't pay their bills.  Second, it may be an FDCPA violation.    

A story in today's Washington Post indicates that a man in Indonesia died after a "harsh interrogation" by a Citibank debt collector regarding an alleged $5,700 debt.  Indonesia is not covered by U.S. federal law, but if this would have happened in America, I'm pretty sure that there were probably a couple of FDCPA violations that occurred in that room before the guy keeled over.

This also reminds me of an old story from the Northern Law Blog vault.  Click HERE for the classic post about a wrongful death case filed by a widow against her late husband's mortgage lender for allegedly killing him with their harassing phone calls.

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

With statutory damages set at $1,000 per violation, plus actual damages and attorneys' fees, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") should be required reading for all general practitioners.  The Act applies to anyone attempting to collect a consumer debt on behalf of another party.  The Act impacts mortgage foreclosures, residential evictions, repossessions, medical debt, and probably about 99% of the cases filed in small claims court.

The Act prohibits several dozen different abusive or deceptive tactics.  They are common sense prohibitions that I don't have time to get into.  Basically don't lie, don't harrass people, don't threaten something that you can't legally follow through on, and don't communicate details of the debt to third parties. But you should still read  the statute because there's a lot of other things that you probably would not have considered.

The more interesting aspects are what the Act requires you to do, not what it prohibits you from doing.  There are several requirements for debt collectors pursuing consumer debts, but I am just going to focus on the very first thing.  Within five days of the initial communication with a debtor, whether it be by phone, in writing, in person, or through a judicial pleading, you must send a written notice to the debtor containing the following information:
(1) the amount of the debt; 
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;   
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and   
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

Thorough practitioners should have a form letter containing these warnings that will be the initial communication to the debtor.  I have a form letter that I am willing to share.  Let me know if you want a copy.  Although the warnings can be given up to 5 days after the initial communication, it is advisable to make this letter the first communication.  That way you don't run in to timing problems and the debtor can't "misremember" or misconstrue the contents of a telephone conversation as a threat.

I have linked to the entire statute HERE in a pdf.  It is worth printing out and glancing at occasionally.  It is about 20 pages, but the sections are concise and easy to follow.  Like I said earlier, it applies to any consumer debt and the consequences for violation are severe.

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

The Co-Debtor Stay.

As you know, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay against the commencement or continuation of any act to collect money or property from the debtor (more specifically, the bankruptcy estate), subject to certain exceptions.  See 11 USC 362.

In cases filed under Chapter 13, the automatic stay is extended to co-debtors.  See 11 USC 1301.  Therefore, upon the filing of a Chapter 13 petition, creditors are prohibited from attempting to enforce their rights against other people who did not file bankruptcy, but who are jointly liable with the debtor on a particular debt. 

It is worth noting, however, that the co-debtor stay only applies to consumer debts of the debtor. Consumer debts are defined in Section 101 as those debts incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.  There are tons of cases dealing with this issue.  Err on the side of caution, but if the debt is clearly not personal in nature, the creditor may proceed against the co-debtor.

Also, even if it is a consumer debt, the co-debtor stay does not apply if the co-debtor became liable on the debt in the ordinary course of the co-debtor's business.  See Section 1301(a)(1). 

So, there are two considerations.  For the co-debtor stay to apply, the original debt must be consumer in nature and the co-debtor's obligations must not have occurred in the normal course of business.  If one of these factors does not apply, neither will the co-debtor stay.  

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

Advanced Collection Techniques in Third Party Citations

A recent case from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals involved several sophisticated collection issues. In Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 629 F.3d 612 (2010), the plaintiff had secured a $124 million judgment against Rogan relating to a Medicare and Medicaid fraud scheme that he executed out of a hospital on Chicago's north side.  Rogan abandoned his defense several years into the fraud case and moved to Canada.  The judgment was eventually entered against him by default.

The plaintiff then commenced supplementary proceedings against Rogan, his wife, and trusts controlled by his three adult children.  Supplementary proceedings are post-judgment processes that support the judgment creditor in asset discovery and final satisfaction of judgment, and specifically include citations, garnishments, wage deductions, etc.  This appeal followed the district court's turnover of assets held by the children's trusts during the course of a third party citation to discover assets.

The Court found that none of the issues raised on appeal required  reversal.  Every point decided by the Court was favorable to the plaintiff, and to creditors' lawyers in general.  The Court issued a 40 page opinion which is overflowing with instructions for creditors' lawyers pursuing third parties in search of the debtor's assets.  Below I have linked to four separate posts examining different issues discussed in the opinion, including a review of the statutes and case law involved. 
Supplementary proceedings (citations to discover assets) are governed by Supreme Court Rule 277 and Section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Every lawyer trying to collect a debt on behalf of his or her client should read these statutes.  They clearly set forth the procedures and remedies available in collection proceedings.  And then for further reference, you should refer back to this blog the next time you think a third party is holding funds on behalf of your debtor.

Finality of Judgments

[This is Part 1 of a four part series concerning advanced collection techniques. The introductory post can be found HERE.]

In the Dexia case, one of the issues raised on appeal was that the plaintiff was attempting to enforce a judgment that was not a final order.  Because that case took place in federal court, the defendants cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).  That rule is substantially similar to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a).  For purposes of this blog, I will refer to the Illinois Supreme Court Rule.

Rule 304(a) is titled "Judgments As To Fewer Than All Parties or Claims--Necessity for Special Finding."  When your judgment order resolves all claims against all parties, it is deemed a final order and there is no need for a special finding.  However, if the judgment does not resolve all claims against all parties--for instance, when there is another defendant out there who you can't get served, or a defendant consents to judgments involving certain claims, but contests other claims--the court must issue a 304(a) finding for the order to be final and enforceable.  A 304(a) finding requires language that the trial court finds "no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both" of the order.  The rule provides that such a finding may be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on the court's own motion or on motion of any party.

Supreme Court Rule 277(a) provides that supplemental proceedings authorized by Section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be commenced at any time with respect to a judgment which is subject to enforcement.  In the absence of a 304(a) finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims against all the parties is not subject to enforcement.

In the Dexia case, the original judgment did not resolve all claims against all parties, nor did it contain a special finding making it a final order.  However, after citations were issued, the trial court entered an order nunc pro tunc dismissing two remaining parties.  At that point, the judgment resolved all claims against all parties and became final.  The Dexia defendants argued on appeal that the citations were invalid, and the turnover orders entered during the citations were void, because the citations stemmed from a non-final judgment order.  They argued that the plaintiff should have started over and reissued new citations after the judgment became final.   

The Court disagreed.  They noted that the defendants made no attempt to explain what purpose would be served by requiring the citations to be re-issued.  They reasoned that requiring the plaintiff  "jump through the procedural hoop" of refiling their citations does not "comport with the efficient administration of justice."

Moreover, the Court found that the district court's actions were consistent with considerations of finality in those situations where a judgment becomes final during an appeal.  The Court cited Lovelette v. S. Ry. Go., 898 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1990) for the proposition that the failure to certify a judgment as final under Rule 54(b) can be cured where the rest of the claims and parties are dismissed during the pendency of an appeal.

So, it is important for creditor's lawyers to consider the finality of their judgments before beginning collections.  But even if the defendant does raise a valid finality argument later in the proceedings, it is worth considering the possibility that the judgment could be finalized retroactively to "comport with the efficient administration of justice," using the Dexia case for authority.

Equitable Theories of Recovery in Third Party Citations

[This is Part 2 of a four part series concerning advanced collection techniques. The introductory post can be found HERE.]

In Dexia, the plaintiff used equitable theories such as alter ego and constructive trusts to recover assets from third parties.  You will recall that the judgment was only against Mr. Rogan, but the court ordered trusts controlled by his children to turnover assets during the course of a third party citation.

The Rogan children argued that the court exceeded its authority when it ordered the turnover of assets. They argued that the equitable theories used against them do not fall within the scope of supplemental proceedings.  They argued that these claims should have been brought against them in new lawsuits.

The Court looked to Supreme Court Rule 277 and Section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Rule 277(a) allows a judgment creditor to commence supplemental proceedings against a third party the judgment creditor believes has property of or is indebted to the judgment debtor.  Section 2-1402 allows the court to order that third party to deliver up those assets to satisfy the judgment. 

The Court found that the Rogan children's property rights had not been adjudicated in the third party citations.  The Court explained that plaintiff had not tried to hold the children's trusts directly liable for anything.  The plaintiff was only trying to recover assets of Mr. Rogan that were in the possession of the children's trusts.  Basically, the plaintiff alleged that the money still belonged to Mr. Rogan even though he had given it away.

The Court noted that the provisions of Section 2-1402 are to be liberally construed and the courts shall have broad powers to compel the application of discovered assets or income to satisfy a judgment.  The Court found that it was proper to use equitable theories of recover in supplementary proceedings to determine if third parties are holding assets of the debtor.  It would be different, however, if the plaintiff had sought to hold the third parties directly liable.

The Court examined the elements of alter ego and constructive trusts in a separate part of its opinion, so I wrote a separate post about them, which can be found HERE.

Alter Ego and Constructive Trusts

[This is Part 3 of a four part series concerning advanced collection techniques. The introductory post can be found HERE.]

The Rogan children claim error with respect to the district court's imposition of constructive trusts on assets that formerly belonged to their father.  Under Illinois law, a constructive trust is imposed to prevent unjust enrichment by imposing a duty on the person receiving the benefit to convey the property back to the person from whom it was received. Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 734, 745 (Ill. 1994).  It is a restitutionary remedy which arises by operation of law, and is imposed by a court . . . in situations where a person holding money or property would profit by a wrong or be unjustly enriched at the expense of another if he were permitted to retain it." People ex rel. Daley for Use of Cook County v. Warren Motors, Inc., 483 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)

A party seeking a constructive trust must establish "the existence of identifiable property to serve as the res upon which a trust can be imposed and possession of that res or its product by the person who is to be charged as the constructive trustee." People ex rel. Hartigan v. Candy Club, 501 N.E.2d 188, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).  But the Dexia Court did not give much guidance on what exactly the plaintiff had to prove to obtain the constructive trust.  Along those lines, the Court noted that particular circumstances in which equity will impress a constructive trust are as numberless as the modes by which property may be obtained through bad faith and unconscientious acts.

Also, the Court made brief mentions to the theory of alter ego, although the specific issue was not examined on appeal.  So, just to give you a little background, I did a quick Westlaw search.   The alter ego theory would be used when you cannot identify specific property to serve as the res of a constructive trust.  In order to prevail on an alter ego theory in a third party citation, the plaintiff must show a high  degree of control  by the debtor through "evidence of misrepresentation; commingling of funds, assets, or identities; undercapitalization; failure to operate at arm's length; and failure to comply with corporate formalities."  In addition, the plaintiff must show that adherence to the corporate form would give rise to fraud or injustice.  See Main Bank v. Baker, 86 Ill.2d 188 (1981). 

Tuesday, February 1, 2011

Tracing Commingled Assets

[This is Part 4 of a four part series concerning advanced collection techniques. The introductory post can be found HERE.]

So, apparently the Rogan children admitted that the district court traced some of their father's property to their trusts, but they argued that the court never determined whether their trusts still owned any of that property, or if they money in their trusts had come from other sources.  They contend that "no one knows precisely what the trusts own and, therefore, what assets are subject to a constructive trust."

On appeal, they argued that plaintiff was required to establish what happened to their father's assets after they were transferred. They essentially proposed that legitimate funds may have been commingled with their father's assets. They did not offer evidence of such commingling or equivocally argue that commingling occurred. Instead, they argued that nobody knows for sure.

However, even if such commingling occurred, it would not have imposed an additional burden of proof on plaintiff. See In re Estate of Wallen, 633 N.E.2d 1350, 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) ("[O]nce claimant made a specific showing that the administrator commingled the assets of the corporation with those of the estate, the burden shifted to the administrator to sort out and account for those assets as he was in the best position to know of them."); De Fontaine v. Passalino, 584 N.E.2d 933, 942 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that when a trustee commingles his own property with that of the beneficiaries, the burden rests on the trustee to show which property belonged to the trustee before the commingling).

Because the Rogan children did not account for what they claimed to be legitimate funds in their trusts, the Court had no option but to affirm the district court's turnover of assets.

Thursday, October 14, 2010

Collecting from Cosigners

I never knew this before today, so I thought I would pass on the information.  It is unlawful to take collection actions against a cosigner without sending them a 15 day notice to pay pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

The Act provides that "No person may .... take any collection action regarding a cosigner of an obligation unless prior thereto, such person has notified the cosigner by first class mail that the primary obligor has become delinquent or defaulted on the loan, that the cosigner is responsible for the payment of the obligation and that the cosigner must, within 15 days from the date such notice was sent, either pay the amount due under the obligation or make arrangements for payment of the obligation."  815 ILCS 505/2S.

Any person violating this Section commits an unlawful practice within the meaning of the Act and, in addition, is liable in a civil action for actual damages, plus reasonable attorney's fees.